


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CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND COUNTER-REVOLUTION

WHY THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES INTERVENED

by Herbert Aptheker

INTRODUCTION

"Why did the Russians do it?" ask the editors of the *New Republic* (August 31), having reference to the entry of Warsaw Pact troops in Czechoslovakia. They answer: "Apparently they had become fearful of shadows"; they suffer from "neurasthenia." In a word, they lack the sanity and courage of the *New Republic* board.

Mr. Sulzberger of the *New York Times* (October 13) has another diagnosis for the psychosomatic illness plaguing "the Kremlin occupants." They are afflicted, says this eminent biologist and psychiatrist, with something called—in a recent bestseller—"the territorial imperative" which "may sometimes derive from remote instincts first noted among wolves, horned owls or lions patrolling their preserves."

In a pitch for money—"deductible for income tax purposes"—the International Rescue Committee is less subtle in explaining "the Soviet Union's rape of Czechoslovakia"; within a one-page letter it four times reiterates that the source lay in "Soviet tyranny." The opponents of "tyranny" include Leo Cherne, who has been pleading for World War III ever since the Spring of 1945, Angier Biddle Duke of the Pennsylvania Biddles and the North Carolina Dukes, Nicholas D. Biddle of the Pennsylvania Biddles, Thomas J. Dodd, the influence-peddler and Red-baiter of the U.S. Senate, Samuel Goldwyn of the Hollywood colossals, Mrs. Clare Booth Luce of the Time-Life-Fortune freedom-fighters, General Carl Spaatz of the B-52 Liberators, and Charles W. Engelhard, who owns more gold and diamonds in that model of democracy, the Republic of South Africa, than any other single human being.

Others—with better credentials as to their concern for human well-being—have also expressed unequivocal denunciation of the act of the Warsaw Pact Powers. I. F. Stone, for example, in his *Weekly* (August 5) writes: "The Czechs stood alone in 1938 against German imperialism. Today they stand alone against Russian imperialism." The prose is symmetrical, but is it accurate?

MUNICH: THEN AND NOW

Did the Czechs (and the Slovaks, Mr. Stone) stand alone against Hitler in 1938? The answer is no and Mr. Stone knows it but in his excitement forgot it. Czechoslovakia stood in the middle of a defensive alliance involving France and the Soviet Union, which alliance was to be collectively implemented whenever one of the three parties faced aggression. France (and Great Britain and the United States) let Czechoslovakia know that it (and they) would not assist her if she offered any resistance to Hitler's and Mussolini's appetites. Indeed, those "democracies" told Czechoslovakia that if she did resist those appetites, they—the democracies—would hold Czechoslovakia responsible should war ensue! There was only one Power which stood by Czechoslovakia and that was the Soviet Union. It affirmed to Benes that if Czechoslovakia resisted Hitler—*whether or not France came to its assistance*—the Soviet Union would come to the aid of Czechoslovakia. This offer was turned down by Benes, who—true to his basic class position when the final moment of decision arrived—preferred the embrace of fascism rather than the assistance of socialism.

Of course, the purpose of Munich was to throw the industrial and geographical prize of Czechoslovakia to Hitler the better for the latter to carry through his announced purpose of destroying the USSR—which is why the Dukes and Biddles of the "democratic West" had created, financed and fattened Hitler in the first place. The Soviet Union had a few diplomatic and military surprises in store for all of these gentlemen; as it has had since and—apparently—still does.

It was because the USSR was socialist and not imperialist that she alone took the stand she did *vis-a-vis* Munich; and it was that socialist base that determined her superb defense against Hitler and the combined might of Europe. Despite over twenty million Soviet citizens killed by the Hitlerites—144,000 of them liberating Czechoslovakia—the USSR emerged triumphant from this most severe ordeal. Mr. Stone knows that, too, when he permits himself to write of "Russian imperialism" and to equate it with nazism.

Since the end of World War II, the other Warsaw Pact Powers—Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the German Democratic Republic—have found it possible to transform themselves from agrarian, raw-material producing areas into modern industrial states. While the first five were in the past subjugated by Turkish or Czarist Russian or Austrian or French, British and German imperial-

ism—which kept them backward^o—they all have emerged, as socialist states, with infinitely enhanced national sovereignty as well as popular well-being. And the German Democratic Republic, that section of Germany which in the past was the most backward and most Junker-ridden, is now a land free of the Junker, purged of militarism, jingoism and fascism. Indeed, while socialism is of course an unprecedented condition for all these peoples and states—wherefore great and often unexpected problems and difficulties are bound to arise—the generally advanced urban and industrial levels of these areas and their enhanced national consciousness likewise represent unprecedented conditions bound to induce new and difficult problems. Far from equating the existence of German and Russian imperialism, it is the diminution of the former and the disappearance of the latter which are among the basic forces in both the great achievements and the great challenges in Central and Eastern Europe.

VIETNAM AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA

In the *New York Times* advertisement on the Czechoslovak events, placed under the initiative of Stewart Meacham of the American Friends Service Committee and Dave Dellinger of the magazine *Liberation*, one reads that Soviet claims of concern about preserving socialism in Czechoslovakia are as false as U.S. claims about saving freedom in Vietnam. "In both instances," says the ad, "the true reason for the use of military force has nothing to do either with socialism or freedom but geo-political purposes."

"Geo-political purposes," however, need not be contrary to concern about both freedom and socialism. The geo-political purposes of the United States in Vietnam are: to crush colonial and national liberation movements, to enhance the commercial and military position of the U.S. ruling class in Asia, to smash the socialist efforts in North Vietnam, and to secure positions from which other socialist areas may be challenged. That is the truth about U.S. involvement in Vietnam, and the barbaric practices of the United States there reflect the barbaric character of the purposes.

Certainly, geo-political purposes were present in the Warsaw Pact Powers' entry into Czechoslovakia. A glance at the map will elucidate the geographic; consideration of developments both within and without Czechoslovakia in the months preceding August, 1968—with

*With the partial exception of the Czech portion of Czechoslovakia.

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which ensuing pages will deal—elucidate the political. Since Czechoslovakia is itself socialist and borders on four other socialist states; since it was the Munich rape of Czechoslovakia which set the stage for World War II and Hitler's ravishment of the USSR, it certainly is *possible*, is it not, Messrs. Meacham and Dellinger, that socialism was involved in the geo-political purposes moving the Warsaw Pact Powers in August, 1968?

In equating the character of the movements of Warsaw Pact troops into Czechoslovakia—with *orders not to fire* and with total casualties under 100 on all sides and most of these apparently suffered by the Warsaw Pact troops—Meacham and Dellinger are guilty of the grossest kind of distortion. The distortion is intensified by the fact that the Warsaw Pact troops brought all their supplies from their own countries, and took not an ounce of bread from Czechoslovakia. To even hint at equating Warsaw Pact troops' conduct in Czechoslovakia with that of U.S. troops in Vietnam is so fantastic an act of distortion that one is forced to excuse Meacham and Dellinger—particularly because of past services—on the basis of hysteria.

DIFFERENCES AMONG COMMUNISTS

Finally, a few words to Communists who have found it necessary to differ with the troop movements of the Warsaw Pact Powers. Here we are dealing with people, obviously, who are not anti-Soviet; on the contrary, being Communists, they are partisans of socialism, despisers of imperialism and grasp Marxism-Leninism with its basic working-class consciousness. These are comrades who feel that an error of judgment was made; that perhaps not all avenues short of troop movements were exhausted; that—and this is what the criticism comes down to—the movements were precipitous.

Certainly it is *possible* that they are right, though they must know that such a step was not lightly undertaken, that public and private discussions were held repeatedly for many months and that comrades other than those in the countries of the Warsaw Pact nations were invited to—and did—participate in such discussions. Nevertheless, it remains possible that the comrades who object—and they are as intensely anxious to preserve and strengthen socialism as are all comrades—are right. We would remark that something of the academic surrounds persistence in such a position in the face of reality; and that given that reality—such comrades must now really be hoping not that they are right but that the others are. And we would add that

their objection in any case is one which—whatever its particular ideological grounding—comes down to a feeling that the troop movement was too soon, too quick. Well, of one thing these comrades may be sure, the movement was *not too late*. That is, these comrades who object and insist that their objection is valid must allow the *possibility* that other comrades who disagree with them are correct. And the movement not being too late, means that those who approve of it did so and do so on the basis of the opinion that the continued existence of socialism in Czechoslovakia was at stake, that the continued leadership there of the Communist Party was at stake, and that this meant, also, a dire threat to the whole Warsaw Pact system and to the security of everything built with infinite labor and sacrifice, since the Bolsheviks stormed the heavens over fifty years ago. Finally, such comrades must consider that this means World War III itself was in the balance; all this follows from the danger of acting too late. It is incumbent upon those who lament the alleged precipitousness of the action to bear this reality fully in mind.

From all this it follows that those comrades—and there were some abroad and here—who reacted to the troop movement by characterizing it as a “disaster” must rethink such a view. The *loss* of Czechoslovakia to socialism—with all that this would mean—*would be* a disaster. That troop movements were necessary is both grievous and tragic—it was a moment when, as Comrade Hall stated in his Report to the National Committee of the Party at the end of August, “there are no good choices available.” At such a moment not to choose is to lose; at such a moment one must be sure that his choice is retrievable, that it is *not* disastrous and that, in any case, the maintenance of socialism and the prevention of world war remain realizable goals rather than shattered dreams.

One further word: World War II and fascism meant to the Soviet Union over twenty millions killed and half its territory devastated. Its people and its leadership will “lean over backwards” to see that such experiences do not recur; those experiences and that partisanship against war and fascism make the Soviet Union today, as in the past, an indispensable bulwark in the struggle for peace and socialism.

DEFENDING “AUGUST”

While polemizing with those who I think are in error, it is necessary—and a pleasure—to observe that others have presented telling arguments in defense of the Warsaw Pact action. This has included

the vast majority of the Communist Parties of the world—and outstanding in this connection was the forthright and early response of the Communist Party of the United States, as reflected in the Report by its General Secretary.⁹ It is my intention not to repeat those arguments but to assume familiarity with them and to bring forth additional considerations and data. Particular attention should be called, however, to the remarks of that veteran radical, Scott Nearing, in the October, 1968 issue of *Monthly Review*. These provide a masterly summary of modern history as the necessary backdrop for a comprehension of such events as those in Czechoslovakia this summer; and Mr. Nearing knows that quite fundamental are two propositions: "The West wants Eastern Europe to restore capitalism. The Soviet Union is determined to have it remain socialist." And Nearing, as has been his wont for sixty years, leaves no one in any doubt as to where he stands.

Another veteran battler whose reaction exudes a similar sense of class consciousness and basic socialist partisanship is Harry Bridges, president of the ILWU. In that union's newspaper—*The Dispatcher* for September 27—he wrote:

The Czechoslovak situation has been taken as a signal by many people who should know better to leap on the bandwagon—which may yet turn out to be a hearse as far as the best interests of world peace and socialism and the world's working class are concerned.

And he adds:

In all the years I've been around I never saw an honest, unbiased and factual report of a strike in the regular press. And I have yet to see where any American newspaper or radio station ever supported a strike or workers who were on picket lines for better wages, hours and conditions.

When these same newspapers and radio and TV commentators start supporting a revolution led by Communists in Czechoslovakia or anywhere else, I not only am suspicious, but I want to take a second and a third and even a fourth look.

OVERALL VIEW

Let us take this "additional look."

We believe the evidence shows the existence of a real threat to

the continued existence of socialism in Czechoslovakia; to Czechoslovakia's continued adherence to the Warsaw Pact system; therefore to the viability of that system itself; and therefore to the continuance of peace in Europe. We believe the threat was internal and external and that each reinforced the other; that while the Communist Party and the working people of Czechoslovakia laid the foundations for socialism in their country and consequently registered important forward strides, the process of building socialism in that country and the actual functioning of that Party left a great deal to be desired and produced legitimate and weighty grievances; that in the necessary effort at renovation and refreshment, the Party increasingly lost its moorings, suffered grievously from factionalism, terribly neglected ideology and increasingly compromised with anti-Party (and anti-socialist) elements.

Had the internal failures, crimes and blunders been less consequential, or more thoroughly and quickly remedied, the process of breakdown and alienation would not have gained the dimensions it did; but these being as great as they were, opportunities for effective anti-revolutionary work by forces both within and outside the country became available. A vicious cycle appeared; disintegration mounted; anti-Soviet groups became more vocal; attacks upon the Warsaw Pact became more open; denunciations of the principle of Party leadership and of working-class rule became more common; efforts at needed reform were sabotaged and/or misdirected; organized opposition appeared and grew in boldness; demands for diplomatic "neutrality" increased at the same time as movements to reorient economically towards the West mounted; finally open and repeated condemnations of socialism as such and talk of the restoration of capitalism became widespread. And despite warnings and promises, the post-January freshet took on more and more the character of a flood, with destruction, not cleansing as the likely result.

Simultaneously, we think, external anti-socialist forces—particularly West German and American (both private and governmental)—had concentrated for years, because of social, historic and geographic reasons, upon Czechoslovakia as one of the decisive breakthrough points in the effort to destroy socialism and preserve imperialism. These intensified their efforts as the internal difficulties and threats mounted; furthermore, certain additional developments outside Czechoslovakia—in the twelve or fifteen months prior to August 1968—aggravated the threat to the security of the Warsaw Pact Powers. Altogether—internal and external—the point was reached where "no

⁹*Czechoslovakia At The Crossroads*, by Gus Hall, New Outlook Publishers, New York, 1968.

good choices were available" and the August choice was made.

EXTERNAL THREATS AND DANGERS

We begin with the external matters that helped induce the August decision. It is elementary in this connection to bear in mind that Czechoslovakia is not alone and that the Warsaw Pact was created, following the birth of NATO, as a defensive alliance by socialist powers against the then-scarcely veiled aggressive purposes of U.S.-British-French (and later West German) imperialisms.

Consequential was the fascist *coup* in Greece. The meanings were several: fascism could and did come again to Europe; a new threat appeared in the Mediterranean (with portions of the U.S. Fleet in Athens); the border with Bulgaria again was an actively hostile one and the laboriously built-up model of peaceful coexistence in the South—to rival that between Finland and the USSR in the North—had been shattered. In this connection—and at about the same time—Yugoslavia's intensified tendency to "move Westward" particularly in economic terms, including new regulations concerning capitalist investments in Yugoslavia, opened up the kind of problems exemplified by Churchill's remark about the "soft underbelly of Europe."

Part of this picture was the Israeli aggression in June, 1967 against Arab countries and her persistence in consolidating her conquests; this, as the Greek events, involved the relationship of forces in the Mediterranean.

DeGaulle's success—with the aid of the ultra-Right and open fascists—in turning back the Left in France in the Spring of 1968 also was a source of disappointment and concern. As a hotbed of reaction and a focal point of war danger, developments in southern Africa—particularly in the Republic of South Africa, Rhodesia and the rebelling Portuguese colonies—similarly created grave concern among those forces seeking to prevent general war.

A fundamental consideration is U.S. developments. These include the continuance and, in many aspects, the intensification of the war upon the Vietnamese people, U.S. involvement in the Greek *coup*, its continued support to the worst hawks in Israel and the most backward elements in the Arab world. They include the Rightward drift within the United States, culminating in the candidacy of Wallace and LeMay, in the Humphrey-Nixon tickets and the crushing of the McCarthy movement.

Of transcendent consequence was the approval of the largest military

appropriation in history, coming to about \$72 billions and really amounting, as Senator Russell of Georgia, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee said, to about \$80 billions, with the likelihood of even additional expenditures if the U.S. is "to honor our commitments abroad." Furthermore, the Spring of 1968 saw the initial expenditure of \$5 billions to commence a new anti-missile defense system and the approval by the Johnson-Humphrey Administration of go-ahead plans for the development of the Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV), which is capable of carrying ten hydrogen bombs over long distances and dropping them, one by one, over selected targets. *Commonweal* (September 6), commenting on the MIRV decision, remarked that such armament additions might well have "furnished fuel to worries of Russia and its allies over their security."

Land and sea maneuvers by NATO were especially intense in the Spring and Summer of 1968; soon after an evaluation meeting of the High Command of NATO, Gerhard Schröder, West Germany's Defense Minister, said he was pleased that its "defensive" plans "included nuclear strikes" (*New York Times*, October 9).

THE QUESTION OF WEST GERMANY

Perhaps decisive in the August move of the Warsaw Pact Powers, however, was the whole question of West Germany. German troops killed perhaps three million Russians between 1914 and 1917; they killed another twenty million Soviet citizens between 1941 and 1945. The meaning of German imperialism is equally clear to others in the Warsaw grouping, particularly the German Democratic Republic and Poland—the latter of which lost seven millions (out of a total of perhaps forty millions) to the nazis.

Are these Powers excessively worried? With the background sketched above, perhaps one will forgive them great caution. But consider these facts:

In 1967 commenced the Grand Coalition in West Germany, which meant the unification in its government of the Christian Democratic and the Social Democratic Parties, i.e., the end of any parliamentary opposition. This past Spring that Government passed the Emergency Decrees—despite massive popular protest and demonstrations. These were explicitly reminiscent of the powers of Hitler and in their wording clearly are intended to destroy the possibility of effective domestic opposition in the face of war being conducted by West Germany.

The President of West Germany, having been exposed as a builder of concentration camps for Hitler, announced that he will retire eleven weeks prematurely. The Chancellor of West Germany joined the Nazi Party in 1933 and rose through the ranks until he held a most responsible position during World War II in Goebbels' propaganda ministry. All of the above reflects a general shift of politics in West Germany decisively to the Right.

In the Summer of 1968 the West German government announced the appointment of a new commander-in-chief of all ground forces: General Albert Schnez. This man joined the Nazis in 1933 and served Hitler during the War as a Colonel. By 1957 he was a Brigadier General in the West German army. In 1967, General Schnez was nominated by Bonn to command NATO forces in the Central Sector of Europe—that is, he would have had command over twenty-three divisions of U.S., British, Dutch, Belgian and West German troops, plus about two thousand planes—the latter with nuclear capability, of course. With this nomination, the *London Observer*, October 8, 1967, published the facts about this General: that he had fought on the Italian and Ukrainian fronts and had shown himself to be a fanatical Nazi, and that as a result when Schnez was recommended as Deputy Commander of the Baltic Approaches of NATO, even the U.S. officer in Supreme Command of NATO, General Lemnitzer, expressed his reservations and that appointment fell through. Then the Dutch government officially objected to his suggested appointment over the Central Sector of NATO and that fell through. It is this man who in 1968 has been appointed Commander of all West German Ground Forces!

The Bonn government, in announcing in the summer of 1968, the plans for the "Black Lion" maneuvers—originally scheduled for the West German border with Czechoslovakia—stated that its commanding officer was to be Lt. Gen. Karl-Wilhelm Thilo. This same General Thilo is mentioned several times in the testimony before the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal, for he had been Chief of Operations on the Southern Command for Hitler. One of his main duties was to crush resistance movements in Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Greece; in doing this he set up hostage quotas—"for one German killed, fifty hostages to be taken"; it was he who ordered: "Leaders, political commissars and couriers are to be shot after interrogation."

The neo-Nazi NPD was founded in 1964 with 473 members. By

mid-1965 it had over 7,000; by the end of 1965 over 13,000; by mid-1966 over 18,000; by October, 1967 almost 34,000 and today something like 50,000 members. Its newspaper is now bought by 100,000 Germans; it now has a total of sixty seats in the Diets of eight out of the ten Federal Provinces.

This is dangerous enough; but more dangerous is the fact that the major parties forming the Grand Coalition have in fact been "fighting" the NPD by absorbing more and more of its program and spirit. Thus, as Prof. Karl Dietrich Bracher of the University of Bonn (and now a visiting professor at the Institute for Advanced Study, in Princeton), writes in *Current History* (July, 1968):

The real danger for the future seems to be that democratic parties seem to be able to absorb the extremist potential by using similar slogans and arguments, with the consequence that the NPD philosophy becomes acceptable to wider parts of German society.

Sebastian Haffner, writing in the *London New Statesman* (September 6, 1968) on the "Czech Crisis," accurately sums up a basic point:

The West Germans—this is not new but it always needs recalling—have never accepted their Eastern defeat, and the one constant factor in their policy during the last 20 years has been the fixed aim to undo the results of the Second World War in the East. What has varied is the means with which this aim has been pursued. In Adenauer's time, West German hopes were pinned on the Cold War. . . . Since the end of the Cold War (sic), first Schröder and then Brandt have developed the conception of the "New Eastern Policy." This policy is certainly different from Adenauer's, but the difference lies in method not in aim. The aim remains unchanged: it makes no practical difference whether Erhard starkly stated that it was the restoration of the German Reich along the frontiers of 1937 or whether Kiesinger elegantly circumscribes it as "overcoming the status quo."

It is relevant to observe that the famous expert on German history and reality, Ernst Henri, published a long analysis, "Is Bonn's Policy Really New?", in the Soviet government newspaper, *Izvestia*, on August 15, 1968. His finding was that the policy was not new; that, rather, it was essentially the same as the "Middle Europe" plan of the Kaiser before World War I and of the German ruling class before and during World War II—a plan seeking German hegemony over Cen-

tral and Southeastern Europe, with the added "refinement" under Hitler of the destruction of the USSR.*

It is the West German government which refuses to recognize the existence of the German Democratic Government; which denies the illegality of Munich from its inception; which refuses to accept the validity of the post-World War II state boundaries (especially those marking present Czechoslovakia and Poland); which rejects the treaty banning proliferation of nuclear weapons; which has the most powerful army on the European continent (except for the USSR); which is led in its civilian government and officered in its military establishment from top to bottom by notorious nazis; which maintains very close ties with both the Spanish and the South African governments; and which does nothing to curb the fantastic growth within its own borders of an openly neo-nazi Party whose very existence is a violation of the Potsdam Treaty.

SOVIET WARNINGS

The Soviet Government has been issuing repeated and solemn and official warnings concerning this; particularly since the end of 1967 these have been exceedingly sober in their text. For example, on December 8, 1967 the Government of the USSR issued a long statement to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany "in connection with the activation of militaristic and neo-nazi forces" within its borders. Its language has the quality of pronouncements from the same government that appeared at regular intervals just before World War II; thus, one reads here:

The Soviet Government is compelled to issue a serious warning regarding the dangerous political developments in the FRG. The Soviet Government, remembering the tens of millions of lives lost by the people in the past war, considers it imperative to take resolute steps that would ensure the curbing of unbridled revanchists and neo-nazis and prevent the revival or reorganization of German militarism and nazism in the territory of the FRG.

That statement ended with these words of direct warning: "The

*The entire article should be read; it is published in *Reprints from the Soviet Press* (New York), September 6, 1968, VII, No. 5, pp. 33-41. The key role of Franz Josef Strauss, formerly in Adenauer's Cabinet and now in the Cabinet of the Grand Coalition, is stressed there as in all the studies coming from the USSR and the GDR.

Soviet Union on its part, will do everything to protect the peoples from the machinations of the neo-fascist and militaristic forces, adopting, together with other peace-loving states, all necessary political and other measures to prevent such developments which could lead to the setting up of another hotbed of fascist danger in Europe and threaten universal peace."

In February, in May, and again on July 5, 1968, the USSR issued warnings of this solemn nature and sent appropriately worded copies to the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and France.

Sebastian Haffner in the already cited *New Statesman* article, notes that the Warsaw Pact troop movement surprised the West German Government and Herr Strauss in particular who thought that "up to now everybody had relied on the Russians never using force at all" but "unfortunately they now stand lined up in great force along the whole frontier of West Germany." Certainly, this is "unfortunate" for Herr Strauss and the Grand Coalition—and the Pentagon and NATO—but none can say they were not warned repeatedly. For those who do not want yet a third civilizing drive eastward from German supermen these troops should be reassuring.

INTERNAL DANGERS

What were the problems inside Czechoslovakia that came to a head in 1968? Economic malfunction became a fact, persistent—even growing in some areas—for about four or five years. The need for the kind of reforms undertaken earlier in such countries as the USSR, Poland, Hungary and the German Democratic Republic was clear; but in Czechoslovakia their implementation was tardy, and then when opted for tended to be excessive—i.e., tended towards inflation, heavy dependence upon the West—for credits, markets and supplies—and the imposition of penalties (in addition to inflation)—even unemployment—upon sections of the working class.

Administrative and legal abuses were numerous and severe. Objections to this were passionate, widespread and merited; several of the fraternal parties—notably including that of the Soviet Union—had warned of this and had urged change and rehabilitation. Promises were made and some positive steps were taken but the promises were greater than the deeds and the abuses were serious.

Formal rather than real actions were frequent and aggravating. Thus, to meet the question of politically-loyal civil and state employees it was ordered that all such personnel must either join the

Party or leave their positions. Of course, tens of thousands joined—the Czechoslovak Party with about 1,700,000 members is proportionately the largest in the world—but joining the Party, under such circumstances, and actually being Communists were in too many cases quite different things. Certain economic changes, especially in the nature of ownership and employment at service establishments, also were purely formal and often induced bitterness and deteriorated service.

An aspect of this excessive dependence upon administrative “solutions” was the quick and total collectivization of agriculture. The speed, and lack of sufficient demonstration and persuasion—and with farming folk both dare not be hasty—also induced bitterness and did not help increase production.

The dependence upon administrative measures reflected and buttressed rigidity; all this helped produce an atmosphere which inhibited technical-scientific advances and seemed to penalize fresh thinking. Intensifying this was a certain anti-intellectualism that manifested itself, for example, in a rather crude egalitarianism with the result that scientists, technicians and physicians were grossly underpaid.

The national question—a very old one, of course, in the case of Czechoslovakia—was not fully resolved. There is no doubt that the relative backwardness of the Slovak nation was significantly overcome with Socialism, and this is one of its accomplishments. Nevertheless—and paradoxically, partially because of these very improvements—the national consciousness of the Slovak people was not fully vindicated and a feeling of resentment against traditional Czech chauvinism compounded the Republic’s difficulties.

All of the above sums up to a disastrous neglect of ideology; this affected in particular the younger people—those who had never known the “glories” of the Masaryk-Benes era. In the “good old days” there had been, in 1923, over 440,000 unemployed (one-fourth of all industrial workers) and in 1933 there were one million without work. In that same year the property of one-tenth of the peasant proprietors was auctioned off to pay debts held by banks. In the fifteen years after World War I, so great were the glories of Masaryk-Benes that 500,000 Czechs and Slovaks left their homeland in search of a livelihood, while in Slovakia actual hunger was endemic.

But the younger generation knew nothing of this—or of fascism and war—from their own experiences; and they were not effectively

taught its reality, its source, and in that connection, the meaning of Marxism-Leninism and the significance, historically, of the Socialist revolution.

Faced by the difficulties, errors, crimes, and failures sketched above—and the urgent need of purification and change—the Party became rent by more and more factionalism—a factionalism fed by rigidity on the one hand and a panicky opportunism on the other.

This can deteriorate to the point of malady—malignant and incapacitating malady. It certainly reached devastating proportions within the Party of Czechoslovakia. It became part of a vicious cycle and with the defeat of the intense dogmatists in January it did not terminate but, on the contrary, accentuated. Further, a tendency developed to resolve the factionalism by appearing to pursue a Centrist position but yielding in fact more and more to the opportunists and—increasingly—clearly anti-party elements.

How much outright treason played in all this, the future must disclose. Certainly when a highly-placed Army officer—General Sejna—defects to the United States a few weeks prior to the August events, one gets an inkling. And if the CIA corrupts the National Student Association, subsidizes the “Congress for Cultural Freedom,” organizes invasions of Guatemala and Cuba, overthrows a government in Iran, helps instigate the slaughter of perhaps 500,000 people in Indonesia, assists in killing democracy in Greece, one must assume it (and other counter-revolutionary organizations, especially in West Germany) are up to their necks in efforts at infiltrating and corrupting Socialist lands.* I would, however, add that unless the soil in that land is prepared by other forces and failures—inside and outside—such corruption is not likely to take root and grow.

One of the results of all the above was that in Czechoslovakia it became quite common to hear a denial of all and any accomplishments by Socialism; and there were attacks upon the Party, upon Marxism and—particularly, against the USSR—that were not only irresponsible but vicious and criminal. This, too, became self-intensifying, so that not only did the attacks upon all three intensify outside the Party’s ranks, but even within Party circles they appeared and grew. This exacerbated inner-Party demoralization which, in turn, fed extra-Party malignancy. Matters reached the point within the Party that the April, 1968 Program affirmed not the basic Leninist

* A very early, and quite full, treatment of this phenomenon is in my *The Truth About Hungary*, New York, 1957, pp. 69-119.

concept—"The Party is the directly ruling vanguard of the proletariat; it is the leader"—but rather denounced what it called "the false thesis that the Party is the instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat."

This line—announced by the Party itself—opened Pandora's box. As Spring moved into Summer, Czechoslovak developments were of such a nature that the normally restrained *London Times* (July 12, 1968) decided that: "The Czechs and Slovaks think that they must break with Moscow if they are to build a free society at home"; naturally her editors found that "one of the most hopeful movements." Surely, history records what the Thunderer means by a free society and the names of the "liberation fighters" of the past who have given its masters reasons to be "hopeful."

SOCIALISM'S ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Before examining in some detail evidence of these "hopeful" developments within Czechoslovakia prior to August, 1968, a few words must be said as to the actual and prodigious accomplishments in Czechoslovakia made possible by Hitler's defeat, the decisive role of the USSR in its liberation, and the peaceful transition* to worker power and the conscious building of Socialism in February, 1948.

The first accomplishment, of course, was the elimination of the private ownership of the means of production. Ending this exploitative and contradictory relationship made possible immense economic strides. Thus, as of the end of 1967, industrial production in Czechoslovakia was five *times* greater than in the year before Munich; in Slovakia the increase was not five but thirteen *times* and therefore its share in the country's total production rose from 7% to over 20% in 1967. Overall, in 1967, Czechoslovakia produced in three months what had taken her a year to produce in 1937. Indeed, Socialist Czechoslovakia surpassed the United States in per capita production of steel and cement; France in pig iron and electrical power; and

** Lenin, January, 1921, *Selected Works*, III, p. 587. The quotation from the April Program is on page 17 of the reprint issued from Prague as a Supplement to the *Information Bulletin* put out by the Peace and Socialism Publishers in April, 1968.

* That it was peaceful was a happy circumstance, of course, and reflected the relationship of forces then prevailing. At the same time such transition—on a different level, Ghana is another example—means that the petty-bourgeoisie and bourgeoisie (very powerful in Prague) remain intact and present.

Great Britain in pig iron, cement and steel. With all this, the material, health, educational and cultural level of the general population of both nations in Czechoslovakia had improved phenomenally.

This does not contradict anything said earlier about failures, but it does place the latter in context and does show the malicious lie it is to affirm that the years of socialism in Czechoslovakia were "twenty wasted years."

EVIDENCES OF COUNTER-REVOLUTION

As to evidences of anti-Party, anti-Soviet, and anti-Socialist developments in Czechoslovakia between January and August 1968, these exist, alas, in abundance. Quite apart from the statements by Czechoslovak leaders since August, and reports by visitors to that country also since that date—notably, in the United States, the reports by Erik Bert and William Weinstone in the *Daily World*—there is abundant evidence and it comes from sources themselves hostile to the Soviet Union, Marxism-Leninism, and Socialism. We offer some of it, and in doing so I am referring only to the material clearly reflecting desires that, under prevailing conditions, can only be labelled counter-revolutionary in its explicit sense: undoing socialism in Czechoslovakia, and removing that country from the Warsaw Treaty and aligning it with the West.

The Prague correspondent of the *New Statesman*, David Caute—neither the magazine nor the man is friendly to Communists—headlined his report (June 21, 1968): "Can the Middle-Class Revolution Succeed?" Mr. Caute thought "the new course" developing in Czechoslovakia was popular among what he called "the middle class" but that great suspicion of it was present among workers, particularly, he wrote, those earning least; indeed, he wrote of "a deeply suspicious working class," in general. He remarked that among "the middle class," especially among the Prague intelligentsia, "Westernized modernist Czech art now holds almost total sway. . . . The decadence stems not so much from the obscenity, the obsession with the grotesque, as from the indiscriminate absorption of American anti-art."

In the same journal, on August 9, K. S. Karol wrote that Caute had "justifiably classified" developments in Czechoslovakia as a "middle-class revolution" and confirmed that the "working class might well fear" it as endangering their living standards. Mr. Karol was certain that the various conferences among fraternal Parties and the Czechoslovak

slovak Party held late in July and early in August "do not matter." Why not? He explained: "Czechoslovakia is becoming a communist country which has nothing in common with her neighbors." Czechoslovakia, Mr. Karol was convinced, as contrasted with the other Warsaw Pact nations—Bratislava Agreement, notwithstanding—is "moving in different directions and supports incompatible concepts of socialism."

William Pfaff, the liberal critic of U.S. foreign policy, in *Commonweal*, August 9, 1968, defined the "movement within the Czechoslovak Communist leadership" as being "toward what the Soviet Union regards, with considerable justice, as Social Democracy." Mr. Pfaff added:

The poignancy of Czechoslovakia's moving toward Social Democracy at precisely the time the Social Democrats of Western Europe have acknowledged themselves politically bankrupt . . . is apparently lost on Russia.

With the Social Democrats having joined hard-core nazis to form a "Grand Coalition" in West Germany, it is clear from subsequent events that Mr. Pfaff was a little premature in announcing what was "apparently lost on Russia"!

Several American observers in Czechoslovakia early in August—and hostile to the Warsaw Pact Powers—published observations shortly after those Powers acted which illuminate the matter. Patrick D. Hazard, for example, of the English Department at Beaver College in Pennsylvania, spent the latter part of July and early August in Czechoslovakia. He writes that in Bratislava two students of architecture amused him "with anti-Russian jokes and stories"; and that they pointed out to him the Slavin memorial to the Soviet dead—in liberating Czechoslovakia—and "noted bitterly that the American Army had no comparable monument in Pilsen, and openly wished that they hadn't stopped there." (*The Nation*, September 9, 1969, p. 203.)

Benjamin B. Page had studied for three years at Charles University in Prague and participated in a Christian Peace Conference in that city in the Spring. He left shortly prior to the entry of Warsaw Pact troops; during that period he observed "a good deal of disorganization and even uncertainty as to leadership." He recorded at the time "a number of conversations with Czechs in various walks of life" and suggests that "these give some idea of the atmosphere within Czechoslovakia to which the Russians were responding." Here is a represent-

ative selection from Mr. Page's reportage (*The Nation*, September 9, 1968; parenthetical matter as in original):

Give us another five or six years and we'll have most of the industry back in private hands (*Economics student*).

We're so liberal now that our crime rate is almost as high as yours. There have been eighteen murders just in Prague alone so far this year—most of them unsolved. Robberies are committed on the streets in broad daylight. . . . Maybe it's not quite safe here, but at least it's a lot freer than it was (*Journalist*).

It's a little ironic that just when they are planning to build a statue to Masaryk over on the Petrin hill, the country he founded seems to be coming apart. . . . Moravians are talking about wanting their own internal government—so are the Silesians and some of the Hungarians . . . and even the Germans still in Bohemia and Moravia. . . . Even Otto Hapsburg has been getting a half-decent press in our country. And what is frightening is that some of those who talk like this, still privately, are in responsible positions (*Writer*).

Not just small shops, but big industry and banking, and maybe even things like medicine should be privately controlled . . . (*Medical student*).

I've just come back from Greece. . . . The CIA did a magnificent job there, a very well done maneuver. And they're doing a pretty good job here, too. I don't say that Dubcek and the rest are conscious agents or anything, but few of us would be surprised to learn that CIA money has been involved. But, as in Greece, it's all to the good (*Journalist*).

Of course! A lot in what we're doing, and even more in what we want to do is counterrevolutionary. But what is tragic is that you Americans do not know how much it would be in your interest to help us. Our state treasury is so empty that people are bringing their old gold and jewelry to the state bank account, and you goddamn Americans won't let us have that gold of ours you have been keeping since the war (*Radio commentator*).

Not long ago some workers sent a letter to their "adopted" factory in the Soviet Union criticizing some aspects of our situation . . . those workers had no right to be critical of situations they don't really understand. All they think of is their beer . . . (*Liberal teacher*).

Still another American, whose politics are of the liberal variety, and who was in Prague August 7-14, has written of his impressions and conveyed data very much like that quoted above. This is Kurt Fishoff, a University student in Los Angeles, who sent dispatches

from Europe to the newsletter known as *William Winter Comments* (issued from Sausalito, Cal.). In the issue dated August 26—and hostile to the Warsaw Pact Powers—is a letter from Prague by this Mr. Fishoff. He reports that, after the Bratislava and Cierna conferences, petitions were being distributed in Prague demanding, among other things, "dissolution of the workers' militia" and that these petitions were on tables where signs in Czech and in German and English appealed for signatures and that "foreigners were urged" to sign.

Mr. Fishoff was impressed with the general desire for less restraint but he also wrote:

... the Czechs I spoke to all insisted that they wanted a "democratic socialism." After one of the meetings I invited a Czech couple to have coffee with me. I again posed the same question as to what they wanted, and they said "75% wanted free enterprise." They want to be able to own their own business, and he said that as soon as the law allows it, he would go into business. The reason I posed the question to this couple is that it seemed most Czechs were parroting Dubcek in this presumed desire for "democratic socialism" and to remain in the Warsaw Pact. But that they said that in order not to upset the applecart, to give the Russians an excuse to intervene. Furthermore, I got the feeling that they'll let Dubcek call it "socialism" to please the Russians as long as they can do what they want—free enterprise, or whatever.

We emphasize that these developments and activities were going on in late July and in August—and even after Bratislava and Cierna. We do so because from time to time the leadership of the Czechoslovak Party would itself call attention to and denounce clearly anti-Party expressions. For example, the Czechoslovak Party warned on June 2, 1968: "We cannot conceal that some discredited political forces of the past, which think their opportunity has again come, are trying to use the democratization and to return to the political scene... Such tendencies conceal danger that would not only threaten the process embarked upon in January, but would also involve the risk of very serious consequences for the peaceful development of the country." (Italics added.)

But while this is officially stated in June—with the estimate quoted—the process of deterioration not only was not halted; it gained momentum, as the quotations from the British and the American (unsympathetic) eyewitnesses in July and August confirm. This is why the London *Daily Telegraph* after the troop movement of August, editorialized that the developments prior thereto were of such a

nature that, "Can anyone doubt that the result, not perhaps soon, but inevitably in time, would have been a non-communist regime?" (August 31, 1968.)

Because of calculations of this nature one found the "hopeful" estimates offered by papers like the *London Times* in July cited earlier. And the West German newspaper especially connected with the *Bundeswehr*, the *Bonner Rundschau* of July 26 was practically licking its chops:

The "iron triangle" formed by these three [Poland, East Germany and Czechoslovakia] is the heart of the Warsaw Pact. It is enough to look at a map to realize what the removal of Prague from this triangle would mean. The southern flank of Poland and the GDR would be exposed and a break-through to the Soviet frontier would become conceivable. The triangle would lose its value and the Warsaw Pact its heart.

THE INCREDIBLE MR. KAHN

It is difficult to conceive of anything clearer than that. Yet, in a way, the remarkable article by the incredible Herman Kahn is perhaps even clearer; certainly it is more full and we bring relevant sections to the reader, at the same time urging that he examine the piece in its entirety. (It appears in the November, 1968 issue of *Fortune*.)

Before observing Mr. Kahn's comments one must remember who this man is. Long a key brain for the Air Force's "think factory"—the RAND corporation—Mr. Kahn has for some years now been Director of The Hudson Institute in upstate New York; that Institute devotes its resources to analysis of politico-military problems and does this for the Defense and State Departments and for some of the leading corporations in the military-industrial complex. It is, in other words, one of the most important, if unofficial, components of the Intelligence machinery of the United States government and its ruling class.

Hence, when Mr. Kahn writes of what he and "so many American students of the Soviet Union" expected and/or believed and/or projected we are getting expert testimony indeed and it is as close to the horse's mouth—i.e., to the Pentagon and the State Department—as it is possible to get and still be in the public prints.

He frankly confesses that he, his Institute and the "many students"

(that *he* knows), were wrong and startled by the action of the Warsaw Pact Powers; they thought that leadership was weak and inefficient and, at best, mediocre and sore beset and that *despite what he and his "many students" knew* was going on in Czechoslovakia that leadership, bankrupt as it was, would do (be able to do) nothing! Now, the latter part of Mr. Kahn's essay is filled with conjectures about the possible future course of that leadership but since he knows nothing about such matters—and therefore has been consistently wrong on questions of foreign policy with Czechoslovakia merely the latest "blooper"—we need not take that seriously. But, I repeat, when Kahn writes of what the "Kremlinologists" here—official and quasi-official—expected in and from Czechoslovakia he is indeed an expert witness. Here is what Mr. Kahn calls "a fair summary of what most Soviet experts in the West anticipated (and what they believed the Russians themselves anticipated)" if there were no action by the Warsaw Pact forces:

In Czechoslovakia itself:

Early recognition of Bonn, followed by West German credits, trade, and influence.

Establishment of strong Western, especially French and German, cultural influences.

Abandonment of "democratic centralism," i.e., of the rule that Communist Party decisions are binding on every party member.

Early emergence of the government as superior to the party; general atrophy of the party's influence.

Development of opposition parties and creation of an effective political opposition . . . a social democracy with capitalist overtones.

All the above would make likely the fall of Gomulka in Poland . . . an effective isolation and weakening of the East German regime . . . probable eventual denunciation of the Warsaw Pact by one or more East European countries . . . a relatively explosive and dangerous fashion, possibly involving an effort at unification of East and West Germany . . . a massive Soviet retreat from Eastern Europe . . . a loss of morale in Moscow . . . very serious threats to the existence of the current Soviet system. . . .

Mr. Kahn adds that Czechoslovak developments clearly called into question the military security of the USSR; that if the above pattern—or a substantial part of it—evolved everything might then "one day culminate in a U.S.-backed West German attack on the USSR"; a "fanciful" eventuality, Mr. Kahn adds, but one that might well have occurred to the Soviet leadership. Yes, indeed, I think it did

occur to that leadership and it and its State and the Warsaw Pact allies being quite different from what Mr. Kahn believes (he admits he is "startled" and quite unsure now) acted in a way that surprised not only Mr. Kahn and his bosses but also—as we noted in a preceding page—surprised Herr Strauss of West Germany and all the assorted *Herren* making up NATO's *Reich*.

Now, after Kiesinger's visit to Franco and before Rusk's visit to that same faithful ally, NATO has had cause to meet in emergency session and re-estimate its plans. The Czechoslovak episode is *kaput* as was the Hungarian twelve years ago. May NATO never want for fiascos; let it continue to depend upon Mr. Kahn and whoever serves the Intelligence departments of Bonn, Madrid and Lisbon!

PASSION AND PARTISANSHIP

Those who seek counter-revolution are not playing. And for those who labor to revolutionize a decadent, obsolete, exploitative, racist, aggressive system, it is clear—or should be clear—that the task is one of great seriousness; to play at "making revolution" is to engage in games and not to be a revolutionist.

To move from capitalism to socialism has taken fantastic effort and sacrifice by the noblest men and women in history; the effort and the result—with all the failures and crimes—are sacred if anything at all is sacred. And, having achieved the break, to maintain it and extend it, takes perhaps as great, maybe even greater effort and sacrifice.

All this means the need for passion and for partisanship. It requires also a comprehension of the foe, a cold hatred thereof and also anything but illusions about its nature. I think the greatest single failing in many Communist Parties—especially some of those in Europe—is an underestimation or a lack of comprehension of the actual character of U.S. imperialism.

To be specific in the case of Czechoslovakia, how else would one explain an invitation to Professor Z. Brzezinski—formerly of the State Department, speech writer for Johnson and Humphrey, now director of Columbia University's Research Institute on Communist Affairs (what could be plainer?)—to lecture before several hundred guests at a closed meeting in Prague this past Spring; and to find the audience not only polite but even responsive? Mr. Brzezinski has

no difficulty getting published and people in Prague, or anywhere else, who require knowledge of his opinions—if for any reason they are obscure—can read them at length.

Or, again, specifically in terms of Czechoslovakia, how is one to explain the fact that when the Director of its Institute on International Politics is speaking in Bonn (March 29, 1967) before the German Society on Foreign Politics and is explaining the genuine desire that exists in Prague for the improvement of West German-Czechoslovak relations and is emphasizing that such improvement cannot occur while the worst forms of revanchism are expressed—that while he is doing this, he goes on to tell that audience that under the pressure developed by the Resistance movements in World War II it was necessary for “the political leaders of the West to adopt such plans for the organization of post-bellum Europe,” as “to lay the foundations for a system which would guarantee the European continent a lasting peace.” And that these post-bellum plans and organizations of—I repeat, *“the political leaders of the West”*—“were progressive, peaceful and opened the way to a new organization of Europe, different from all preceding ones.”

What post-bellum Western leaders were progressive and peaceful and what progressive and peaceful organizations did they create? This is not Professor Brzezinski I am quoting; it is Dr. Snejdarek in Bonn, in 1967, and I have taken it from the 1968 journal published in Prague by the Institute he heads.

If the realities of imperialism are grasped, how is it possible for the leader of a significant institution in a socialist country to think this way—and I have more examples from other figures of distinction. When Martí said this imperialism—he had in mind, of course, particularly its U.S. variant—was a “monster” he was correct and he was correct eighty years ago! But today, with what has happened since, and with its present conduct and weapons, etc., to speak of it as a monster is to manifest the limitations of language.

This reality is not fully grasped in many quarters where it should be self-understood; this failure is one of the greatest dangers confronting progressive mankind today—I mean this *failure at comprehension*, because it can and it does induce inactivity or illusions.

WHO WAS MASARYK?

Perhaps one of the most dramatic illustrations of such illusions—

and of what failure in ideological preparation can induce—is the appearance of a veritable Masaryk craze in Czechoslovakia. Streets were re-named for him in the Spring of 1968, elaborate ceremonies were held at his grave, his portrait appeared in many shop windows and serious proposals were made for the building of a Masaryk monument.

That the U.S. press, from the *New York Daily News* to the *New York Post*—i.e., trumpeteers for the ruling class of every range—should have “discovered” Masaryk and lavished praise upon him is understandable, and in character for both that press and that man. But to see similar estimates in the press of a Socialist country is something else.

Who was Masaryk? He was a liberal professor, a bourgeois-nationalist, a man fortunate enough to marry the daughter of a Chicago banker, a leading anti-Marxist theoretician of the pre-World War I era. Naturally, then, Masaryk was a bitter foe of Lenin, an intense opponent of the Bolshevik Revolution, an informant for Woodrow Wilson, hand-picked by the latter as Czechoslovakia’s first President, suppressor of socialist aspirations in his homeland, participant in the violent suppression of the socialist revolutionary government in Hungary in 1919, and in the military intervention against the young Soviet republic in Russia, adherent to the West’s blockade of the USSR and until his resignation in 1935 (he died in 1937) Chief of a State which was decisive in helping maintain capitalism in middle Europe.

Masaryk himself tells us proudly that prior to World War I, “The [Czarist] censorship passed my [book] *Critique of Marxism*, which was widely read in Russia and made my name known.” During that War, from London, his Intelligence Department “established relations,” he wrote, “with the Russian Secret Service.” After the Czar’s overthrow, as revolutionary ferment deepened, Masaryk was conveyed by the Allies from London to Moscow where he made what became a lasting friendship with Miliukov, Foreign Minister of the Provisional Government.

He was pleased, he wrote, to find in Moscow, “a few people who were open to reason and had retained pro-Ally feelings.” Masaryk was in Moscow at the time of the Bolshevik success; he was, indeed, chosen as the spokesman for the anti-Revolutionary foreigners. He detested Lenin and was anti-Russian to the point of plain anti-Slavic chauvinism—he wrote of “the passive Russian character—why bother

about anything but bread." Lenin, he wrote, was a "usurper" and the Bolsheviks represented "moral degeneration" while their program meant "anarchy in morals" and the "decline of schools and education." He stated he could never forget the "senseless and barbaric" Bolsheviks.

In the Spring of 1918, being in Tokyo, he prepared a confidential memoir for Wilson in which he suggested that the Bolsheviks might retain power for some time but that they would "die of political dilettantism." He outlined for Wilson a plan for the defeat of the Revolution but suggested this be developed by stages with a coalition government, including, at first, Bolsheviks; he thought, too, that the separation of the Ukraine was quite possible.

Then, coming to the United States, he was selected to be Czechoslovakia's leader with the approval of Washington. It was in the United States that Czechoslovakia's October 1918 birth was announced—and thanks to Wilson and Masaryk and what both represented, her October was to be quite different from Russia's November. Naturally, Masaryk had only praise for Wilson; he, wrote Masaryk, "was and remains one of the great pioneers of modern democracy."

No wonder that Miliukov—from his position as a professor in the United States—wrote an essay exalting Masaryk and affirming: "As long as Masaryk is there everything will be all right." Let it be added that Walter Duranty, writing in the *New York Times*, August 30, 1924, reported the unveiling of information that it was through Masaryk that 300,000 rubles had been paid to assassins for the killing of Bolshevik leaders.*

Perhaps enough has been said about Masaryk to suggest what the craze in his favor conveyed to the leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries. It is not strange that the U.S. Post Office has issued a stamp honoring Baron Mannerheim as a freedom-fighter, the murderous Baron who suppressed the workers of Finland in massive massacres and who became Hitler's ally in World War II; but it would be strange—would it not—if, when Finland is socialist, there should appear a widespread movement to honor and memorialize him? Would not one have reason, then, to doubt the efficiency of the socialist education of its youth and the intensity of desires to retain and purify Socialism?

*Quotations from Masaryk are from his *The Making of a State* (London, 1927), pp. 133, 135, 170, 174, 192, 243, 278. The Miliukov essay is in *Foreign Affairs*, April, 1930; quotation from p. 406.

CONCLUSION

Perhaps all that has been said in the above pages, plus the material in Gus Hall's pamphlet (which, as I stated, I did not intend to repeat), justifies the opinion that the Warsaw Pact Powers made a necessary—though painful—choice on August 20-21, 1968.

I believe that all partisans of peace and socialism must draw satisfaction from the several treaties which have followed that event and from the swift withdrawal of perhaps 85 per cent of the Warsaw Pact forces, and from the mutual agreement that all concerned were in favor of implementing the course of renovation symbolized by the January, 1968 decisions.

The summation given by Dubcek after the three-day Plenum of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Party, held in mid-November, offers ground for realistic confidence. Dubcek said all were united "on the strategic question of our policy, our alliance with the Soviet Union." He said there was unanimity, also, in "facing resolutely the anti-socialist provocations and the extremist opinions that fail to comprehend the new tasks, the needs and the search for new methods."

Further, Dubcek made clear:

We are united in that we shall further develop the basic positive aspects and the decisive parts of the post-January policies, cleansed of the errors and deficiencies that occurred in that period. On this basis, we shall strengthen the leading role of the Czechoslovak Party.

All Communists may unite on such a statement. It requires an awareness that dogmatism, rigidity and ossification may be as dangerous to the health of a Communist Party as are opportunism and eclecticism. Communists may unite, too, on the decisive significance of the Soviet Union; on Kadar's observation: "There has never been, is not, and never will be, anti-Soviet Communism."

All Communists desire the safeguarding of socialism in Czechoslovakia, as elsewhere, the rectification of errors, the advancing of democratic renewal, the security of the Warsaw Pact, the building of international unity.

All Communists—without illusions about imperialism—and with deep awareness of their fundamental solidarity, must labor together,

* In *International Affairs*, May, 1966, p. 6.

together, in order to prevent the holocaust of World War III, in order to smash imperialism, and in order to strengthen and extend Socialism.

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